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The Early Years of Demining in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina:  
Transfer to National Ownership
by Ian Mansfield
After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords on 14 December 1995, the newly formed Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested 
that the United Nations set up and manage a mine clearance 
program. However, it soon became clear that the government 
should take responsibility and ownership of the program. 
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina took place between 
April 1992 and October 1995. While the causes of the war and 
what happened are extremely complicated, Bosnian Serbs en-
circled Sarajevo and imposed a blockade, while ‘ethnic cleans-
ing’ operations were undertaken by all sides in towns and 
villages throughout the country.
As a result of the Dayton Peace Accords, the fighting 
stopped, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was to remain one coun-
try; however, it was divided into two entities: the Republika 
Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation. The country was 
to be governed by the Council of Ministers, consisting of one 
representative each from the Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, 
and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). These representatives would 
share the presidency on a rotating basis, and elections were to 
be held to elect a parliament. Each entity was allowed to keep 
its own army, but a large, international military force called 
the Stabilization Force (SFOR) was deployed throughout the 
country to enforce the peace.
The Landmine Problem
As the fighting was intended to drive people out of their 
homes, landmines were used extensively throughout the con-
flict to keep people away from villages. Large, front-line areas 
developed along the boundaries between different ethnic 
groups, and mines were also laid in vast numbers to protect 
these areas.
The majority of the known minefields in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were located along the 1,000 km (621 mi) long 
Inter-Entity Boundary Line, which divided Republika Srpska. 
The Muslim Croat Federation Records of over 18,000 mine-
fields were available but toward the end of the war, many 
mines were laid without being recorded, and it was estimat-
ed that these maps represented only 50 to 60 percent of the 
minefields in the country. At the time when the Dayton Peace 
Accords came into effect, many believed that there could be 
up to one million landmines laid in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
along with an unknown number of unexpoloded ordnance 
(UXO) waiting to be cleared. Accurate casualty figures were 
difficult to obtain, but there seemed to be general agreement 
that about 50 civilians were killed or injured by landmines or 
UXO every month since the end of the war in 1995.1
Initial Response
In January 1996, the fledgling Bosnian government request-
ed United Nations’ assistance with setting up a mine action 
program. The responsibility fell to the United Nations Mission 
in Bosnia Herzegovina (UNMIBH), which established the 
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United Nations Mine Action Centre (UNMAC) in June 
1996. As part of the transition of the mine action program 
to national ownership, a rather complex set of organizational 
changes were agreed upon by the Council of Ministers and 
the United Nations in October 1997. Responsibility for the 
mine action program was planned to transfer from UNMIBH 
to the government on 1 January 1998. However, the govern-
ment was not ready, and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) took over the interim responsibility. 
The government set up the Commission for Demining, the 
role of which was to keep the Council of Ministers informed 
on the progress of demining in the country, to approve na-
tional mine action plans and standards, and to oversee the 
work of UNMAC. The Commission for Demining consisted 
of three members: a Bosnian Serb, a Bosnian Croat, and a 
Bosniak; and they effectively performed the role of the na-
tional mine action authority.
UNMAC would transition to become the Bosnia 
Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) and it would be 
responsible for managing all central database records, setting 
priorities and issuing task orders, overseeing quality man-
agement or standards of work being done, and raising funds. 
The Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation 
would set up their own offices to supervise and undertake 
mine clearance.
Mine Clearance Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina
However, UNMAC was not the only program in the coun-
try. Beginning in 1996, foreign governments began bilat-
eral support for demining in Bosnia, with Norway funding 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). As the first civilian organi-
zation to work in Bosnia, NPA focused on clearing impor-
tant infrastructure projects, cultural heritage monuments, 
and damaged houses and apartments in support of refugee 
settlement programs in Sarajevo. The German government 
funded the trial of two demining machines, and a German 
bomb disposal school trained Bosnian refugees in Germany. 
The Belgium government funded two technical advisers to the 
Demining Commission.
In 1997, via the entity governments, the World Bank fi-
nanced mine clearance operations by international commer-
cial companies, all of whom had established subcontracts 
or joint venture arrangements with local commercial mine 
clearance companies. This was the first time the World Bank 
had funded mine clearance work, and it was not without its 
difficulties. Over US$10 million was made available to com-
mercial companies, leading to the sudden formation of 40 lo-
cal companies.
Fourteen contracts were awarded, but the majority of the 
money went through two international companies: MineTech 
and RONCO. Both were reputable companies and had es-
tablished partnerships with some Bosnian companies, one 
for each of the three ethnic groups. However, in early 1998, 
MineTech pulled out of Bosnia, and—due to a disagreement 
with the World Bank—the United States withdrew its funds 
from the World Bank and gave the money directly to RONCO.
A debate occurred regarding the merits of using commer-
cial companies for mine clearance as opposed to nonprofit or-
ganizations, like nongovernmental organizations (NGO) or 
government agencies. The pro-commercial argument was that 
commercial companies were more efficient because they were 
in a competitive environment. The counter-argument was that 
commercial companies only assumed easy tasks, and it was al-
leged that the local Bosnian companies cut corners and com-
promised on safety to keep their costs down. On the other 
hand, the NGOs said that they focused on house clearance, 
which was slow but necessary in Bosnia, as refugees needed 
to be able to return home. The various commercial companies 
and NGOs endeavored to produce figures to estimate their 
clearance costs per square meter. However, it is the author’s 
opinion that the figures were neither accurate nor convincing.
In the former Yugoslavia, a government body called the 
Civil Protection Organization (CPO) dealt with natural disas-
ters like fires and floods, and was also responsible for civil-
ian bomb disposal. In Bosnia, the CPO still existed albeit in a 
much weakened state. It fell under the purview of the Ministry 
of Defence, which made it difficult for the United Nations and 
World Bank to engage with the organization. In 1997, the 
European Union decided to support the CPO, funding train-
ing and providing equipment and vehicles for 12 mine clear-
ance teams and nine bomb disposal teams. In the urgency to 
get things moving in Bosnia, little thought went into project 
Norwegian People’s Aid deminer in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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sustainability. In early 1998, 
the CPO could not afford to 
take on the teams who were 
trained. As a result, hun-
dreds of deminers were laid 
off, and equipment sat idle 
while waiting for more funds 
from the European Union.
Frustrated at the slow pace 
of house clearance in Bosnia, 
the United Nations Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR) decid-
ed to fund its own clearance 
teams. In 1997, UNHCR 
trained and equipped a total 
of 240 deminers. These teams worked on house and apartment 
clearance in the two entities, but it was agreed that the project 
would come under the overall umbrella of the national pro-
gram.
Finally, under the Dayton Peace Accords, the respective 
armies of the two entities were required to undertake mine 
clearance work. Under the supervision of the international 
military contingents from SFOR, if the entity armies under-
took certain tasks like mine clearance, they earned credits, 
which allowed them access to funding, new weapons, or cer-
tain training opportunities. The entity armies had previously 
undertaken what they called “mine lifting” tasks, which in-
volved using a minefield map to remove only the mines that 
were marked on the map.  Sadly, as the work was undertak-
en by recently conscripted troops who did not check for any 
additional mines outside the mine lanes that may have been 
laid subsequently, there were a high number of injuries and 
deaths. No central records were kept of this work, and no 
one was confident that the areas involved were completely 
cleared. While the entity armies certainly had the potential 
to speed up the national mine clearance effort, this seemed to 
be a wasted endeavor.
Transition Process
Although the Commission for Demining was notionally the 
government authority in charge of all mine action, it only had 
varying influence over the seven different groups or projects 
outlined. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the government was 
weak, and a range of significant mine clearance activities were 
already underway without any coherent national plan in place. 
At the coordination level, there were only a few Bosnians in 
the BHMAC who had been identified as suitable to take over 
management roles.
The demining commissioners said they did not think that 
the government could meet the 1 July 1998 deadline for the 
transition of the mine action program from United Nations to 
government control. In many ways, the government was not 
ready; however, it had to be done. At the next Commission for 
Demining meeting in May 1998, UNDP announced that the 
handover would take place as planned on 1 July 1998, without 
the possibility for an extension.
To assist with the handover, the ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina – 
National Mine Action Plan – 1998’ was developed with the 
cooperation of the World Bank and European Union. The 
program aimed to reduce the number of civilian landmine 
and UXO casualties, clear houses for returning refugees 
and internally displaced persons, and make land safe for 
agriculture, reconstruction, and development activities. The 
key elements of the plan detailed the transition to government 
control and outlined what the U.N. components would do. 
The amount of confirmed or pledged funding came to US$18 
million total for 1998. With another $22 million requested, 
this total amounted to US$40 million for the year. Deminers’ 
salary costs were one of the main reasons for the large figures. 
In Afghanistan and Laos, deminers were paid US$100 per 
month. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of the European 
cost of living, the rate was around US$800 per month.
As the Dayton Peace Accords attracted significant interna-
tional attention, many high-level visitors came to see the mine 
clearance work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most famous 
visitor was Diana, Princess of Wales, who visited the U.N. 
Mine Action Centre in Sarajevo in early August 1997, just 
weeks before her death. Other notable visitors at the time in-
cluded Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, Japanese 
Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi, and the head of UNHCR, 
Mrs. Sadako Ogata.
Preparing for the Handover
In preparation for the handover of responsibility, a two-day 
workshop was arranged at the Marshall Tito Barracks from 
11 to 12 June 1998. Over 100 demining supervisors from a va-
riety of organizations from the two entities attended. Getting 
people into Sarajevo from all over the country involved de-
tailed logistical planning, and U.N. vehicles were dispatched 
to ensure safe passage for many attendees.
The meeting went extremely well. The participants, many 
of whom were former combatants who had probably fought 
against each other, discussed technical issues cordially. Despite 
political tension amongst participants, the meeting was a suc-
cess overall and helped clarify the national program’s way for-
ward. Because of its technical nature and obvious benefits to 
Diana, Princess of Wales,  
at the Bosnian Mine Action  
Centre.
Photo courtesy of J.J. Van der Merwe.
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communities, the mine action sector showed that it could be 
part of the peace-building efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The use of the Bosnian entity armies in mine clearance was 
another issue that needed to be addressed. These armies were 
a huge, under-utilized resource with the capacity to provide 
future clearance. The military had previously resisted taking 
tasking orders from a civilian body or having their work in-
spected by civilians. As the team leaders’ meeting involved 
some personnel from the entity armies, they left with a bet-
ter understanding of the national program. Following subse-
quent meetings with entity armies, SFOR representatives, and 
donors, significant agreements were reached.
The international military contingents from SFOR agreed 
to train and equip the entity army deminers according to 
the new international standards, and the United States an-
nounced that they would set up three training centers. The 
entity armies agreed to accept clearance tasks from BHMAC 
and to allow civilian inspectors to accredit army units and 
check their work. Due to civilian sensitivities remaining 
from the militaries’ actions during the war, the military 
would focus on clearing areas around military bases, air-
fields, and industrial sites, as opposed to clearing houses. The 
one sticking point was extra insurance to cover the army de-
miners, but Canada and Norway agreed to provide funds to 
cover these costs.
Local candidates were identified to head the new BHMAC, 
entity centers, and other key posts within the offices. However, 
quite a few positions would still have to be filled by U.N. staff, 
and there would be a reliance on donor funding for many 
years to come.
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On 1 July 1998, a day of ceremonies marked the handover, 
as the United Nations transitioned ownership of the BHMAC 
to the government, and the new Bosnian managers were 
sworn in. The entity armies were to sign agreements that fell 
under the umbrella of the national program, but at the last 
minute, some alleged inequality was raised that halted pro-
ceedings. The signature of these agreements eventually took 
place on 6 July 1998. The transition to national ownership of 
the mine action program was complete—at the political level 
at least. 
See endnotes page 64
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